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The incidence of taxes on consumers and producers plays a central role in evaluating energy tax policy,
yet the literature testing the main predictions of the tax incidence model is sparse.  In this paper, we
examine the pass-through rate of state gasoline and diesel taxes to retail prices, and importantly we
estimate the dependence of pass-through on factors constraining the gasoline and diesel supply chains.
We consider several factors that alter the elasticity of supply, including within state heterogeneity
in gasoline content requirements, refinery capacity utilization, inventory constraints, and variation
in the demand for untaxed uses of diesel. In general, we find that in periods of time when the supply
chain is constrained, and the constraint is plausibly unrelated to shifts in demand, the pass-through
rate of fuel taxes declines. We describe several potential implications for tax policy, including tax
breaks during peak driving season and during times of supply disruptions such as after major hurricanes.
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Tax incidence plays a central role in current energy policy debates. The extent to which taxes
are passed through to retail prices, and on what the pass-through rate depends, determines in
part the distributional impact of carbon taxes, the eﬀectiveness of using a tax holiday to ease
high fuel prices, and how tax policy can be used to respond to disruptions in the fuel supply
chain, such as those caused by natural disasters like hurricane Rita.
While the theory of tax incidence is front and center in the textbook treatment of taxation,
the main predictions of the tax incidence model are largely untested. Though it is often assumed
that commodity taxes are fully passed through to consumers, this assumption is based on
relatively few empirical studies. There is only sparse evidence regarding the extent to which taxes
are incorporated into retail prices, as noted by Poterba (1996) and Doyle and Samphantharak
(2008), and little work examining the extent to which tax incidence responds to changes in
market power or supply elasticity. As a result, the empirical literature on tax incidence is
unable to shed much light on the aforementioned policy questions.
In this paper, we examine the pass-through rate of fuel taxes to retail prices by utilizing
changes in state gasoline and diesel taxes. Our primary contribution is estimating the depen-
dence of pass-through on factors constraining the gasoline and diesel supply chains. Under-
standing this dependence provides insight on how tax policy might be conditioned on observed
supply conditions. Furthermore, to the extent by which supply chain constraints suggest varia-
tion in the elasticity of fuel supply, it provides a test of a fundamental prediction of tax incidence
theory.
Consistent with prior literature on gas tax incidence, we ﬁnd that state gasoline and diesel
fuel taxes are on average fully and immediately passed on to consumers. The above result masks
important heterogeneity in the rate of pass-through, as we ﬁnd evidence consistent with the
notion that pass-through falls in times of inelastic supply. In particular, the pass-through rate
of diesel is low when reﬁnery capacity utilization is at its highest, and when untaxed uses of diesel
fuel are less important (which reduces the residual supply elasticity of taxed diesel). We ﬁnd that
the pass-through of gasoline taxes is lower when gasoline content regulations are heterogeneous
within a state, which has been found to constrain reﬁners’ ability to adjust production in the
short-run. (see for instance Muehlegger, 2006). Moreover, it has been suggested that inventories
play a role in constraining the market power of wholesalers – we ﬁnd that when inventories are
constrained from below, the pass-through rate of diesel taxes is greater than one.
Our ﬁndings have several implications for current tax policy. First, our work speaks directly
2to the eﬃcacy of “fuel tax holidays.” Like Doyle and Samphantharak (2008), who examine
the eﬀects of a gas tax moratorium on prices in Illinois and Indiana, our work suggests that
the beneﬁts of a tax holiday will be driven by contemporaneous market conditions. We ﬁnd
that the relationship between capacity utilization and the tax pass-through rate diﬀers between
diesel and gasoline. Gasoline taxes are fully passed through to consumers regardless of season
or capacity utilization. Consequently, a seasonal state gas tax holiday would apparently provide
relief to consumers. In contrast, the pass-through of diesel taxes falls during periods of high
capacity utilization. This ﬁnding is particularly relevant for fuel tax holidays. Although fuel
taxes are passed-through fully under normal circumstances, fuel tax holidays are most attractive
to legislators during times of high fuel prices induced by supply chain constraints. We ﬁnd that
at these times, taxes are likely to be shared between consumers and producers - consequently,
consumers are unlikely to reap the full beneﬁt of fuel tax moratoria.
Second, our results inform the politics of increasing gasoline taxes. The proposal of the
Deﬁcit Reduction Committee recently advocated increasing gasoline prices as part of balancing
the federal budget. In addition, several carbon proposal put forth in 2010 implicitly taxed
gasoline and diesel by taxing carbon emissions from reﬁnery operations. Our ﬁndings inform the
distributional consequences of these policies. We ﬁnd that under most circumstances, gasoline
and diesel taxes are fully passed onto consumers. Moreover, since demand for gasoline and
diesel fuel are relatively inelastic, our results suggest that reﬁners, wholesalers and retail station
operators likely require little compensation (in the form of tax credits or free carbon permits)
to be made whole.
In addition, our work makes several contributions to existing literature on fuel taxes and to
the broader literature on tax incidence. To our knowledge ours is the ﬁrst study to consider the
incidence of diesel fuel taxes. Moreover, our work is unique in its examination of how regula-
tions aﬀect tax pass-through. Chouinard and Perloﬀ (2004,2007) and Alm et al (2009) provide
evidence regarding the incidence of gasoline taxes on retail prices using state-level variation in
taxes and prices. Chouinard and Perloﬀ (2004) tests the response of incidence to residual supply
elasticity at the state level, noting that small states should have a greater supply elasticity and
therefore a higher rate of consumer incidence. More generally Poterba (1996) examines the inci-
dence of retail sales taxes on clothing prices, Besley and Rosen (1999) consider city-level prices
across twelve commodities, and a number of papers including Sung, Hu and Keeler (1994), Bar-
nett et al (1995), Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001), Harding, Lovenheim and Leibtag (2009) and
Chiou and Muehlegger (2009) estimate cigarette tax incidence as well as how incidence varies
3geographically or demographically.1
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical discussion of incidence and
supply. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methods we will use. Section 4 presents the
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model and Industry Background
We consider a quantity tax of t per unit of a good, which is paid by the supplier. A unit mass
of ﬁrms sell a quantity q of this good to consumers at the tax inclusive price p.C o n s u m e r s
have an aggregate demand for the product given by D(p), while competitive supply can be
characterized by the function S(p,t). The textbook approach to characterizing incidence starts








where Sp, St,a n dDp represent the derivative of supply with respect to price and tax and the
derivative of demand with respect to price, respectively.
Suppose diesel is produced at cost C(q)w h e r eC (q) > 0a n dC  (q) > 0. If ﬁrms behave
competitively, this yields the proﬁt function
Π(q)=p(q) − tq − C(q). (2)
Firms produce to the point where price is equal to marginal cost, or q = φ(p − t)w h e r e
φ(p −t)=C −1(p−t). Supply is a function of the price net of tax, so that the supply response
to taxes is the same as the response to prices: Sp = −St. Substituting this into equation
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where η and   are the elasticities of supply and demand, respectively. The rate of pass-through
goes up as supply is more elastic and demand is less elastic.
A long literature in public ﬁnance extends this result to non-competitive markets and shows
that tax pass-through in oligopolistic markets can exceed one under certain demand conditions.
1Early empirical work on incidence includes Due (1954), Brownlee and Perry (1967), Woodard and Siegelman
(1967), and Sidhu (1971).
4Following the derivation in Stead (1985), a ﬁrm with market power facing consumers with
constant demand elasticity will more than fully pass taxes along to consumers. For ﬁrm i





where  i is the residual demand curve faced by the ﬁrm. Since the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm will






The primary contribution of our paper is to estimate how fuel tax pass-through responds to
constraints at various points of the supply curve. We brieﬂy describe the US supply chain for
petroleum products. We then present a discussion of factors that shift the elasticity of supply
η and empirically examine how these shifts aﬀect the pass-through of gasoline and diesel taxes.
A four-part supply chain (reﬁning, bulk transport, terminal storage, and retail delivery) de-
livers petroleum products to US consumers. Crude oil is reﬁnery primarily at domestic reﬁneries,
with ﬁfty percent of domestic reﬁning capacity located in Texas, Louisiana and California. From
1983 to 2003, 94 percent of national gasoline consumption was reﬁned domestically.2 Diesel fuel
and gasoline are shipped from reﬁneries in bulk by pipelines or barge to wholesale terminals
located near most major US metropolitan areas. Wholesale terminals hold gasoline and diesel
inventories to smooth local demand shocks - from the wholesale terminals, tanker trucks trans-
port fuel to industrial and commercial customers and to retail stations for sale to individual
drivers.
2.2 Reﬁnery Constraints
We examine the eﬀect of four supply chain constraints on fuel tax pass-through. The ﬁrst
constraint we study is when demand for reﬁned products approaches domestic reﬁning capacity.
Demand for reﬁned products tends to peak during the summer driving season. On average,
domestic reﬁnery capacity is 92 percent utilized during summer months in our study period.
2Although regulations do not prevent gasoline and diesel fuel from being reﬁned outside the United States and
imported into the country, imports face several barriers to being an eﬀective way to mitigate the eﬀects of supply
chain constraints. As Borenstein et al (2004) notes, many arbitrage opportunities (due to unanticipated demand
shocks or supply constraints) are relatively short in duration. The lag between reﬁning product to meet US fuel
requirements and shipping the product to US markets is often great enough to prevent foreign reﬁneries from acting
as a competitive source of peak supply.
5During several summers of our sample, though, utilization peaks at over 99 percent. During
periods of high capacity utilization, academic studies and government investigations have noted
that gasoline prices tend to rise dramatically.3 Moreover, unanticipated reﬁnery closures often
lead to large increases in local prices.
Reﬁnery capacity constraints persist for two reasons. First, siting a new reﬁnery is very
diﬃcult. Due to environmental regulations, siting challenges and resistance from local commu-
nities, no new domestic reﬁneries have been built since 1976 (although a small reﬁnery (163k
bbls/day) is currently proposed in Arizona). Second, expansions of capacity at existing reﬁneries
is limited in scope - the growth of domestic reﬁning capacity to approximately 1.0 percent per
year between 1995 and 2005, the period during which domestic reﬁning capacity was heavily
utilized. Over the same decade, consumption of reﬁned products has increased by 1.7 percent
per year.
2.3 Storage constraints
Firms’ abilities to store gasoline and diesel fuel at wholesale terminals introduce important
complications when considering tax incidence. Storage places restrictions on the intertemporal
evolution of prices. Suppose that a change in the tax rate in time t+1 is anticipated at time t.
Allow ﬁrms to store an amount of fuel, St,f r o mt i m et to t + 1 at a marginal storage cost of k.
A wholesale terminal chooses storage to maximize expected proﬁts:
Et[Πt+1]=Et[pt+1 − τt+1]St/(1 + r) − (pt − τt)St − kSt (4)
The ﬁrst-order condition of a competitive storage ﬁrm is therefore given by
(E[pt+1] − τt+1)/(1 + r)=pt − τt + k. (5)
A simple model of storage predicts that ﬁrms will use storage to arbitrage away anticipated
diﬀerences in prices net of taxes. So long as the no-arbitrage condition holds, prices will rise by
the amount of the tax increase and taxes will be fully passed onto consumers. Importantly for
our context, the condition (5) should hold even when production is temporarily inelastic, such
as when reﬁneries face short-run capacity constraints.
There are several reasons why the simple no-arbitrage condition given by equation (5) may
not hold for gasoline or diesel fuel. Borenstein et al (2004) note capacity constraints in the
3see e.g. Muehlegger (2006) and the FTC Midwest Gasoline Price Investigation
6storage market. If capacity constraints in the storage market are binding, the shadow value of
the storage constraint would enter into (5). At the low end, storage obviously cannot fall below
zero.
In addition, storage plays an important role in mitigating market power in wholesale fuel
markets.4 Inventories help to mitigate market power concerns that may arise due to short-
run mismatches between supply and demand – ﬁrms are less able to exercise unilateral market
power if other ﬁrms hold large inventories. When inventories are low, competitors may be less
able to oﬀset a reduction in quantity by a competitor. If inventories act as a hedge against
market power in wholesale fuel markets, the residual demand elasticity faced by the ﬁrm would
be negatively correlated with competitors’ inventories. When inventories are low, ﬁrms able to
exercise temporary market power may more than fully pass the taxes onto consumers.
Consequently, the relationship between inventories and tax incidence is complicated. In a
market with no constraints and costless storage, we should expect to estimate full pass-through in
a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced speciﬁcation. However, if storage capacity constraints bind, pass-through may
either decrease or decrease. Inventoriesare unable to respond to changes in price, thereby making
supply elasticity, however low inventories may increase market power at wholesale terminals, in
which case it is conceivable that wholesalers will be able to more than fully pass taxes along to
consumers.
2.4 Residual Supply Elasticity
For diesel, untaxed supplies provide a source of inventories that supplement wholesale terminal
inventories. No. 2 distillate can either be sold as diesel or as heating oil, which suggests that
the supply of diesel is the residual of No. 2 distillate supply after subtracting the demand for
fuel oil. The residual supply of diesel is therefore given by Sdiesel(p)=S(p) − Doil(p), where
S(p) is the supply of No. 2 distillate.5 Diﬀerentiating with respect to p, we obtain the residual
supply elasticity of diesel,6
ηdiesel = η/σ −  oil/σo (6)
where ηdiesel is the residual supply elasticity of diesel, η is the supply elasticity of No. 2 distillate,
σ is diesel’s share of No. 2 distillate,  oil is the demand elasticity for fuel oil, and σo is the supply
4As Borenstein et al (2004) notes, signiﬁcant barriers to entry exist in the fuel storage market. Consequently,
wholesale storage markets tend to be relatively concentrated.
5We consider the residual supply rather than residual demand since demand is likely to be largely independent
across fuel oil and diesel markets, while supply is interrelated.
6Chouinard and Perloﬀ (2004) perform a similar exercise for gasoline, showing how the residual supply elasticity,
and therefore pass-through, in a state is higher as its share of national gasoline demand is lower.
7of diesel relative to the supply of fuel oil. The supply elasticity is therefore greater when fuel oil
demand is high relative to diesel, and a more elastic supply of diesel should increase the pass-
through of the diesel tax to consumers. In the empirical section to follow, we utilize variation
in weather and households’ use of fuel oil as factors that shift σ and σo.
2.5 Environmental Regulations
Finally, we consider environmental regulations that complicate the bulk transportation, whole-
sale storage and local distribution of gasoline. In 1990, the Clean Air Act Amendment mandated
special requirements for fuel in regions failing to meet EPA limits for ozone and carbon monoxide
pollution. The EPA designed reformulated gasoline (RFG) to reduce mobile-source emissions
(cars) in areas in serious or severe ozone non-attainment.7 For regions in carbon monoxide
non-attainment, the EPA designed oxygenated gasoline for winter use.8
Special blends complicate the petroleum product supply chain – reﬁners must determine
which blends to produce in advance, pipeline operators must manage the transportation of
a larger number of incompatible fuels and wholesale terminal operators may have to manage
storage for more than one speciﬁcation of gasoline at once.9 Consequently, we anticipate that
taxes will be less fully passed-through in states where regulatory heterogeneity is greater.10
3D a t a a n d M e t h o d s
3.1 Data
We collect a 20-year monthly panel of average state-level prices of gasoline and diesel fuel from
the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The EIA reports the monthly average price of
7Initially, nine cities with 63 million residents fell into this category: Baltimore, Chicago, Hartford, Houston, Los
Angeles, Milwaukee, New York City, Philadelphia and San Diego. Subsequently, Sacramento was reclassiﬁed as in
severe ozone non-attainment area in the summer of 1995. In addition, many other states, counties and cities chose to
voluntarily adopt the new, more stringent reformulated gasoline standards. Between 1995 and 2001, areas containing
approximately 35 million people have “opted-in” to the federal RFG program.
8Oxygenated gasoline is required in winter months where carbon monoxide emissions are greatest. Thirty-nine
areas were in non-attainment initially, containing 86 million people. Of these areas, the majority have since come
into attainment and stopped using oxygenated gasoline in winter months.
9As an example, following Hurricane Rita, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources received an EPA waiver
from local RFG requirements. The EPA determined that “an ‘extreme and unusual fuel supply circumstance’ exists
that will prevent the distribution of an adequate supply of RFG to the St. Louis RFG covered area.” The waiver
allowed St. Louis retail stations to sell conventional gasoline from Sept 27th until October 7th - since the supply of
conventional gasoline to the area outside of the RFG covered area was relatively unaﬀected.
10Special blends may also increase concentration if they are suﬃciently costly for reﬁneries to produce. For example,
the FTC complaint for the Chevron Texaco merger speciﬁcally singles out reﬁning, bulk supply and marketing of
California Air Resource Board (CARB) gasoline. We do not ﬁnd evidence that pass-through varies for conventional
gasoline and special blends.
8No. 2 distillate separately by the type of end user for twenty-three states.11 To measure the
price of No. 2 diesel for on-highway purposes, we use the price to end users through retail
outlets. This price is virtually a perfect match of the low-sulfur diesel price, which is almost
exclusively for on-highway use. The EIA publishes average retail gasoline prices for all ﬁfty
states monthly from 1983 onwards.
We collect information about the federal and state gasoline and on-road diesel tax rates from
1983 to 2003 from the Federal Highway Administration Annual Highway Statistics.12 Federal
on-road diesel excise taxes were four cents per gallon in 1981, rising to the current level of 24.4
cents per gallon in 1993. State on-road diesel excise taxes also rose throughout the period, from
a weighted average excise tax rate of 9.2 cents per gallon in 1981 to 19.4 cents per gallon in
2003.13 Within-state variation also rose throughout the period. In 1981, state on-road diesel
taxes varied from a low of 0 cents per gallon in Wyoming to 13.9 cents per gallon in Nebraska.
In 2003, Alaska imposes the lowest state diesel taxes, at 8 cents per gallon, while Pennsylvania
imposed the highest taxes of 30.8 cents per gallon. As with diesel taxes, state and federal
gasoline taxes increased during this time frame. In 1983, the federal gasoline tax was four cents
per gallon and average state gasoline taxes were 11.3 cents per gallon. In 1983, tax rates were
lowest in Texas at ﬁve cents per gallon and highest in Washington and Minnesota at 16 cents
per gallon. By 2003, the federal gasoline tax rose to 18.4 cents per gallon and the average state
gasoline tax rose to 20.5 cents per gallon, with a low of 7.5 cents per gallon in Georgia and a
high of 30 cents per gallon in Rhode Island.
We also collect data capturing market factors that aﬀect the demand and supply of gasoline
and diesel. Our demand shifters for diesel fuel are primarily related to temperature and the
prevalence of the use of fuel oil as a home heating source. We obtain monthly heating degree
days by state from the National Climate Data Center at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. The number of heating degree days in a month, commonly used to model
heating demand, is deﬁned as the sum of the daily number of degrees the temperature is below
65.14 We also measure state heating oil prevalence using the fraction of households in a state
11The EIA surveys prices for states using No. 2 distillate as a “signiﬁcant heating source.” (source: EIA Form
782b explanatory notes) Price data exists for Alaska, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and all states in New England (PADD1a) and the Central Atlantic
subdistricts (PADD1b).
12Several states in our sample also levy ad-valorem taxes on gasoline or diesel sales. Since the vast majority of the
tax changes in our sample are changes to state and federal quantity-based excise taxes, we focus primarily on the
pass-through of these taxes. We do not ﬁnd that the pass-through of quantity based excise taxes diﬀers signiﬁcantly
for states that additionally levy ad-valorem taxes and states that do not levy ad-valorem taxes.
13Oregon does not tax diesel sold for trucking, instead taxing the number of weight-miles driven in the state. For
this reason, we exclude Oregon from the subsequent analysis.
14For example, if the temperature in a state were 55 degrees for each day in the month of January, the number of
9reporting in the 1990 census to use fuel oil as the primary energy source for home heating. In
addition, we collect state unemployment rates and we calculate the minimum diesel and gasoline
tax rates in neighboring states.
To measure capacity constraints at domestic reﬁneries, we obtain national, monthly reﬁnery
capacity utilization from the EIA for 1990 to 2003. Capacity utilization is deﬁned as the ratio
of total crude oil input to the total available distillation capacity – capacity utilization captures
both production constraints arising from both high demand and from unanticipated reﬁnery
repairs. In addition, we obtain monthly data on diesel and gasoline inventories at the PADD-
level from the EIA for our entire time period. We normalize the inventories by the average daily
demand in the prior 12 months in each PADD to measure inventories in terms of number of
days of supply.
To measure the eﬀect of environmental regulations, we collect data on within-state variation
in gasoline content regulations. For each state, the EIA tracks the proportion of gasoline meeting
federal reformulated gasoline requirements, federal oxygenated gasoline requirements and less
stringent conventional gasoline requirements.15 To measure within-state heterogeneity, we sum
the squared proportions of RFG, oxygenated and conventional gasoline. A value of one denotes
uniform regulation for the entire state; a value of one-third denotes that equal amounts of
reformulated, oxygenated and conventional gasoline are sold.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our variables. To help interpret the results re-
garding capacity utilization and incidence, the variable means are also reported separately for
months with diﬀerent rates of US reﬁnery capacity utilization. The average tax inclusive retail
price is 120.8 cents per gallon over the course of the series. This price is on average highest
when capacity utilization is between 90 and 95 percent, though it is in fact lowest at the highest
level of capacity utilization.16 Over our sample, tax inclusive gasoline prices average 118 cents
per gallon. Unlike diesel prices, the average gasoline price rises as reﬁnery capacity utilization
increases. The average state diesel tax rate is 18.2 cents per gallon, compared with the average
federal tax of 19.8 cents per gallon. Gasoline taxes average 17.1 cents per gallon at the state
level and 14.2 cents per gallon at the federal level. The average month has 5.3 heating degree
heating degree days for each day would be 10 and the number of heating degree days for the month would be 310.
15The EIA does not report quantities when quantities are small enough to potentially infer the actions of any
one company. After ﬁrst-diﬀerencing, EIA redaction causes us to omit twenty-seven percent of the base sample.
Redaction varies by region - forty seven percent of the observations in PADD 5 are omitted after ﬁrst-diﬀerencing,
while only seventeen percent of the observations in PADD 2 are omitted after ﬁrst diﬀerencing. Importantly, we do
not ﬁnd that our base pass-through results diﬀer signiﬁcantly when we limit ourselves to this subsample.
16Since the capacity utilization series is not available for the entire sample, the means separated by capacity
utilization may appear inconsistent with the overall mean.
10days. Since cold months tend to have lower demand for gasoline, the average degree days are at
their highest when reﬁnery capacity utilization is at its lowest. For the average state, 28 percent
of households use fuel oil (diesel) to heat their homes, yet this varies considerably across states
as standard deviation of this variable is 0.20.
The average capacity utilization is 91 percent. Low capacity utilization months dispropor-
tionately occur in the winter and spring, while 88 percent of high capacity utilization months
are in the second and third quarters of the year. Twelve percent of the gasoline sold during
the period met federal reformulated gasoline requirements. Approximately two percent of the
gasoline sold met federal oxygenated requirements. Content regulations vary substantially both
within and across states. Although the mean of the sum of squared content shares is 0.95,
the value is less than 0.75 for approximately ten percent of the sample, and less that 0.6 for
approximately ﬁve percent of the sample.
Tax increases are most likely to come when capacity utilization is low, as there is a 2.7
percent likelihood a state raises its diesel tax in a month with a capacity utilization of less than
85 percent, compared with 1.6 percent overall. This is primarily due to January being a popular
month for tax changes. Yet tax increases in high capacity utilization months are not uncommon.
States raise taxes in 1.2 percent of months with a capacity utilization above 95 percent, and tax
increases are in fact more likely during these months than when capacity utilization is between
85 and 95 percent.
To further illustrate the variation used in this paper, Figure 1 shows the average diesel
tax rate over time for the 22 states we use in the analysis, and the number of states per year
changing taxes. The average tax per state increases steadily over time, with the growth rate of
taxes perhaps slowing somewhat beginning in the nineties. Fewer states changed diesel tax rates
during the nineties, yet we still see that several states change taxes in each year of the data.
The only exception is 2000, when tax rates were stable for all states. Figure 2 shows a similar
series for gasoline taxes. Gas taxes rise over time, with the rate of growth slowing considerably
in recent years. Nonetheless, each year saw at least two states increasing gasoline taxes, with
most years witnessing between ten and thirty states changing tax rates.
3.2 Methods
The approach taken in this paper is to estimate the eﬀect of federal and state taxes on post-tax
(consumer) prices. We assume that the data generating process at the state-month level for
11prices pit in cents per gallon is given by:
pit = β0 + β1T S
it + β2T F
t + BXit + ρi + σt +  it (7)
where T S
it and T F
t are the state and federal tax rates in cents per gallon, Xit is a vector of time-
varying state level covariates, ρi is a state-level ﬁxed eﬀect meant to capture time-invariant local
cost shifters, and σt represents time eﬀects. To estimate (7) in the presence of the unobserved
state-level heterogeneity described by ρi, we will estimate the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equation
Δpit = β0 + β1ΔT S
it + β2ΔT F
t + BΔXit + σt +  it. (8)
The coeﬃcients β1 and β2 are therefore estimated from contemporaneous changes in taxes and
prices.17
Our approach provides a signiﬁcant advantage over estimating the relationship in levels. In
order for our estimates to be biased, the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced omitted variable must be correlated
with state-level tax changes. Thus, demographic trends (or other slow moving variables) are
unlikely to bias our results, whereas they are more likely to be correlated with prices in a levels
regression. In addition, other variables that change discretely such as transportation policy
variables must change contemporaneously with the state-level tax changes in order to bias our
results. Furthermore, for the majority of our results, σt consists of month*year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Although our eﬀects prevent the estimation of the pass-through of federal taxes (β2), the ﬁxed
eﬀects subsume all state-invariant shocks that aﬀect gasoline or diesel prices.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Basic incidence results
The results of estimating equation (8) for diesel are presented in Table 2. The speciﬁcations
presented in column 1 control for year and month eﬀects, while the speciﬁcation shown in column
2 also includes state-level covariates. By separately controlling for state and month eﬀects, we
allow for the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of both state and federal fuel taxes. Our ﬁndings
indicate that a one cent increase in the state tax rate increases the retail price by 1.22 cents,
17If tax changes are endogenous to prices then this approach will not be valid, a problem shared with other studies
of gasoline tax incidence. For instance, if tax increases are not undertaken when prices are increasing, then our
estimate of β1 will not be valid. We have found little relationship between tax changes and factors aﬀecting supply
conditions. Furthermore, the lag between the passage of a tax rate increase and its implementation implies that tax
increases are unlikely to be related to unexpected changes in supply.
12and every one cent increase in federal taxes is estimated to increase the consumer price by 1.1
cents. We are unable to statistically distinguish the pass-through rate of state taxes from that
of gasoline taxes. Prior theoretical work on incidence suggest that pass-through of greater than
100 percent is possible. (see Katz and Rosen, 1985; Stern 1987, Besley, 1989; Delipalla and
Keen, 1992; and Hamilton 1999) While the estimates for the incidence of state taxes suggest
more than full pass-through, we cannot reject a null hypothesis of merely full pass-through. It
is worth noting that there are few tax changes from which to estimate the pass-through rate
of federal taxes. One of these tax changes occurs in October of 1993, coinciding with more
stringent content regulations for diesel fuel. In these and future speciﬁcations, we will include a
separate regressor controlling for the change in prices in October of 1993.
We next account for a richer set of time eﬀects by controlling for year*month eﬀects. Since
federal taxes vary only at the year*month level, this precludes the estimation of β2.I nc o l u m n
3, we present the results. Including the ﬁner time eﬀects has a noticeable eﬀect on the estimates
of β1. We estimate a pass-through rate for state taxes of 1.09, which as before is not statistically
distinguishable from one, but is more precisely estimated.18
Changes in taxes are not necessarily immediately reﬂected in the retail price of diesel. Lags
in adjustment by both suppliers and demanders could make short-run elasticities diﬀer from
longer-horizon elasticities. To account for the dynamic adjustment of taxes into prices, we
follow Alm et al (2009) by including the lagged tax rate in the speciﬁcation shown in column
4 of Table 2. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term is estimated to be 0.071 and statistically
insigniﬁcant. Therefore, almost the entire eﬀect of changes in tax rates are immediately realized
in prices.19
We next investigate whether the price response is linear in the size of the tax change. We
divide tax changes into 24 evenly sized bins 0.5 cents wide. We then ﬁnd the average change
in price by bin. The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 3, where we see that the
relationship in the data between price and tax changes appears linear.
In Table 3, we display the basic incidence results for gasoline. These results are not new,
18One drawback to using state-level price data is that the EIA only reports these data for 23 states. It is desirable
to provide incidence estimates for the entire US, as the states for which we have price data may not be representative.
We perform a similar analysis aggregating state taxes and covariates up to the PADD-level, at which the EIA reports
data for all states. We present the results in Appendix Table A2. With PADD-level covariates and month and year
ﬁxed eﬀects, we estimate the pass-through rate of the average state tax rate of 1.01, while the pass-through rate of
the federal tax rate is 0.98. Using year*month eﬀects, we estimate pass-through of 1.04, very close to the analogous
state-level estimate of 1.09. Similarly, we ﬁnd that taxes seem to be immediately reﬂected in the retail price of diesel.
19It is unlikely that controlling for the lagged tax rate will have the power to account for longer horizon adjustments
by demanders. For instance, if higher prices leads to the take up of more eﬃcient vehicles by drivers, even a relatively
swift adjustment in the ﬂow of vehicles purchased will only alter the fuel eﬃciency of the stock of existing vehicles
very slowly.
13as they have been documented using similar variation in Alm et al (2009) and Chouinard and
Perloﬀ (2004). Consistent with these papers, we ﬁnd full pass-through of state taxes. Unlike
Chouinard and Perloﬀ, we also ﬁnd full pass-through of federal gasoline taxes. We employ a
speciﬁcation of the changes of gasoline prices and taxes, a source of diﬀerence with Chouinard
and Perloﬀ, who estimate a speciﬁcation in levels.20 We also ﬁnd that the gasoline tax is fully
incorporated into gasoline prices in the month of the tax change, as the lagged tax rate is
small and statistically insigniﬁcant. These ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of covariates and
year*month eﬀects.
We again examine the linearity of the relationship between tax changes and prices by dividing
gasoline tax changes into 24 evenly spaced bins 0.5 cents wide. The average price change in
each of these bins is shown in Figure 4. As with diesel, there appears to be a linear relationship
between changes in taxes and changes in prices.
4.2 Supply Conditions and Tax Incidence
4.2.1 Untaxed diesel and supply elasticity
We next examine whether the incidence of diesel and gasoline taxes varies with three changes in
supply conditions – changes in the residual supply elasticity arising the demand for untaxed uses
of diesel, supply inelasticity arising from reﬁnery capacity constraints, and supply conditions
related to varying inventory levels. To test the ﬁrst, we will include a triple interaction between
the state tax rate, the heating degree days in a state-month, and the prevalence of fuel oil’s use
to heat homes in the state. In cold weather, demand for untaxed diesel fuel increases with the
proportion of households using oil for residential heating. As shown in equation (6), substantial
demand for an untaxed alternative will increase the residual supply elasticity of taxed diesel in a
state.21 While cold weather may directly inﬂuence the price due to delivery cost or cold-weather
20Under certain assumptions, estimating a speciﬁcation of the level of gasoline prices, controlling for state ﬁxed
eﬀects, and estimating a model in ﬁrst-diﬀerences should both yield consistent estimates of the pass-through param-
eter. Given the serial correlation in tax rates, we are concerned that unobserved factors that shift over time will be
correlated with both price and taxes, and therefore the speciﬁcation in levels will be more prone to bias than the
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced speciﬁcation, which estimates the pass-through parameter using only contemporaneous changes in
t a x e sa n dp r i c e s .I ft h i si st r u e ,t h el e v e l ss p e c i ﬁ c a t i o ni slikely to be particularly sensitive to misspeciﬁcation of the
time trend. In the Appendix Table A1, we estimate a levels speciﬁcation similar to that of Chouinard and Perloﬀ
(2004) using diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the time trend. In column (1), we control only for seasonal dummies. In the
speciﬁcation showin in Column (2) year enters linearly, while in column (3) year enters quadratically. Finally in the
speciﬁcation shown in column (4) we allow for a full set of year and month eﬀects. The estimate of the pass-through
of the federal tax varies wildly across the speciﬁcations. On the other hand, the estimated pass-through rate is stable
across diﬀerent forms of the time trend in the ﬁrst-diﬀerences speciﬁcations, as shown in columns (5)-(8)
21We choose not to use a direct measure of σo for two reasons. First, at least in the pre-dye period, sales of distillate
intended for on-highway use comprised a signiﬁcant share of reported fuel oil sales. Second, the fuel oil series is often
missing.
14additives, this speciﬁcation will control for state degree days directly so that the eﬀect of tax
changes in cold weather is compared between states with diﬀering levels of household fuel oil use.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that fuel oil demand could directly inﬂuence the price of diesel in
a state. We condition on the interaction of degree days and fuel oil use by households, which
should capture any demand eﬀects on price, and focus instead on the coeﬃcient on the triple
interaction between diesel taxes, degree days, and fuel oil. Finally, our measure of household use
of heating oil is a snapshot from the 1990 census and therefore on its own will not be directly
correlated with month-to-month variation in prices.
The last column of Table 2 presents the relationship between residual supply elasticity of
taxed diesel and tax pass-through. To make reading the table easier, degree days have been
divided by 100. The coeﬃcient on the interaction between degree days/100, the state tax rate,
and the fraction of households using fuel oil to heat their homes is 0.055. This implies that a state
with a one standard deviation greater fraction of households using heating oil (20 percent), in a
month with 1000 degree days (approximately equal to February in Chicago), has a pass-through
rate 11.0 percentage points higher than a month with zero degree days.
4.2.2 Capacity Utilization
To examine how incidence varies with domestic reﬁnery capacity utilization, we separately es-
timate the incidence of state taxes for months with high and low levels of capacity utilization.
Capacity utilization is measured at the national level in our data, and therefore we are not
exploiting cross-state variation in supply constraints. Instead, we are examining how the pass-
through rate of a state’s tax depends on the prevailing national supply constraints. If reﬁners
are operating at full capacity, there is little scope to alter production in the short-run in re-
sponse to changes in taxes. For gasoline, periods of high capacity utilization may also indicate
particularly strong demand, which could be associated with more inelastic demand. Capacity
constraints may therefore be associated with two conﬂicting eﬀects on gas tax incidence, as both
demand and supply are less elastic. It is worth noting that diesel demand does not appear to
drive capacity constraints, and therefore diesel tax incidence may provide a clearer view of the
eﬀect of supply elasticity on pass-through.
Since supply may only be truly constrained for high levels of capacity utilization, we will
allow for the eﬀect to enter nonlinearly. We estimate incidence separately for months with less
than 85 percent capacity utilization, between 85 and 90, between 90 and 95, and above 95
percent. Since capacity utilization tends to be higher in the summer months, we also perform
15the estimation separately for the four quarters of the year to investigate the possibility that the
eﬀect depends on the season.
The results for diesel are presented in Table 4. In Panel A, we show the results for capacity
utilization. We ﬁnd that there is virtually no diﬀerence in incidence between 80 and 95 percent
capacity utilization. The incidence parameter for less than 85 percent capacity utilization is
estimated to be 1.29, 1.00 for 85-90 percent capacity utilization, and 1.06 for between 90 and 95
percent capacity utilization. None of these coeﬃcients are statistically distinguishable from one.
However, there is a noticeable diﬀerence in the estimated incidence for tax changes occurring
in months with greater than 95 percent capacity utilization. For these months, only 41 percent
of the diesel tax is passed through to consumers. Therefore, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of capacity
utilization on incidence is highly nonlinear, as it is only noticeable for the most capacity con-
strained months. However, it is worth noting that even in these extreme situations, almost half
of the tax is born by consumers. In Panel B, we present the diesel incidence parameter sepa-
rately by season. We ﬁnd that the rate of diesel pass-through is statistically indistinguishable
from one regardless of quarter.
In Table 4 we present similar results for gasoline. Unlike diesel, we ﬁnd that gasoline incidence
is largely independent of capacity utilization. We estimate that consumer incidence is 90 percent
of the gasoline tax in the highest capacity utilization months, which is indistinguishable from
one. This diﬀers from the diesel result, likely due to the fact that capacity constraints are driven
by a large extent by demand for gasoline. In Panel B, we present results indicating that the
pass-through rate of the gas tax is virtually one for the ﬁrst, second, and third quarters of the
year. This suggests that a state tax holiday occurring during the summer would be fully passed
to consumers.
4.2.3 Inventories
Next, we estimate the association between incidence and inventories, as measured at the PADD
level by the days of supply of gasoline and diesel stored at the wholesale level. Inventories are
constrained by storage capacity since there are signiﬁcant barriers to entry in the storage market.
Storage is also likely to be constrained at the low end as well due to marketing costs, which
are suspected to be highly nonlinear at low levels of inventory (see Pindyck, 1994). Storage
constraints could indicate a less elastic supply curve, in which case less of the tax is passed on to
consumers. On the other hand, stored gallons could represent competition for producers. Low
inventory levels could therefore exacerbate any regional market power, and market power could
16in fact lead to over-shifting of taxes to consumers.
To examine the eﬀect of inventories, we include wholesale inventory levels (measured in terms
of days of supply), lagged inventory levels to capture dynamic adjustment, and the interaction
between inventory levels and the state tax rate. The former term captures the eﬀect of invento-
ries on price levels, while the interaction term captures the association between inventories and
tax incidence. We also consider periods of time where inventories are likely to be constrained,
interacting changes in the fuel tax rate with indicators for the monthly inventory lying in the
bottom 10 percent and top 10 percent of all monthly inventories in the sample.
In Table 6, we present the results for diesel in panel A and gasoline in panel B. Each
speciﬁcation includes the full set of covariates, as well as month*year ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd that,
for both gasoline and diesel, the inventories are negatively correlated with the tax-inclusive
price. When considering the interaction between inventories and taxes, we ﬁnd that lower
inventory levels are associated with a signiﬁcant decrease in pass-through for gasoline, but not
for diesel. We estimate that a one standard deviation decrease in inventories is associated with
approximately 13.1 percentage point greater pass-through of gasoline prices.
Interestingly, pass-through spikes substantially in months where diesel inventories are par-
ticularly low. In the bottom ten percent of inventory months, approximately 159 percent of
diesel taxes are passed through to consumers. In the absence of market power, pass-through
must be between zero and 100 percent regardless of the elasticities of supply and demand.
Therefore, rather than indicating a particularly inelastic supply curve during those months,
this over-shifting suggests that low inventories are associated with market power on the part of
suppliers.
The same does not hold for gasoline. While pass-through is estimated to be higher during
the low gasoline inventory months, this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand,
when gasoline inventories are unusually high – in the top ten percent of inventory months –
pass-through is estimated to be substantially lower. This is consistent with inelastic supply
when inventories are constrained.
4.2.4 Regional Content Regulations
Finally, we examine the introduction of regional gasoline content regulations and estimate the
relationship between regulatory heterogeneity and pass-through of gasoline taxes. Although the
particular example is speciﬁc to gasoline, interaction between regulatio n sa n dt a x e si sc o m m o n
– many industries face both taxes on inputs or products as well as regulatory standards their
17processes or products must meet. Moreover, examining environmental regulations present a
potentially cleaner test of supply constraints than examining reﬁnery capacity constraints or
inventory constraints. Both high reﬁnery utilization and low inventories are at least partially
driven by demand. The fraction of a state’s gasoline required to meet content regulations, on
the other hand, is largely set exogenously to monthly supply and demand conditions.
We control for changes in the composition of a state’s gasoline sales by including the percent
of gasoline sold within the state meeting federal Reformulated and Oxygenated requirements. As
a measure of the complexity of wholesale storage and distribution, we sum the squared market
shares of Conventional, Reformulated and Oxygenated gasoline in each state. A value of one
denotes a state using a consistent blend of gasoline state-wide. Importantly, a value of one does
not diﬀerentiate between a state using all conventional gasoline or all reformulated gasoline - in
each case, the wholesale storage and distribution of gasoline is uncomplicated. In contrast, a
value of one-third would denote a state that uses all three types of gasoline in equal proportion
and requires the most complex supply chain. The most heterogeneous state in our sample period
is Nevada (0.37), which uses roughly equal quantities of all three formulations during the winter.
We then interact our measure of regulatory homogeneity with the state’s gasoline tax rate to
test if incidence is correlated with variation in a state’s gasoline regulations.22
The estimates are presented in Table 7. All of the speciﬁcations include ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
control variables as well as month*year ﬁxed eﬀect. In column 1, we present the results from
estimation our baseline gasoline speciﬁcation (column 3 from Table 3) including only the seventy-
three percent of the data for which we observe content shares. We estimate a very similar pass-
through rate for the subsample – the point estimate is 1.067 (in comparison to a point estimate
of 1.053). As with the full sample, we cannot statistically distinguish our estimate from full
pass-through. In the speciﬁcation shown in column 2, we include the percent of gasoline sold
as reformulated and as oxygenated are added as additional covariates to the base speciﬁcation.
While both are positively correlated with price as we expect, neither coeﬃcient is statistically
signiﬁcant.
In column 3, we include the sum of squared content shares as well as the interaction term.
Consistent with our prediction, we ﬁnd reduced pass-through of gasoline taxes in states requir-
ing more heterogeneous gasoline supply. We estimate that pass-through is approximately 22
percentage points higher in states with uniform regulations (eg. California or Massachusetts)
22Special blends may also increase concentration if they are suﬃciently costly for reﬁneries to produce. For example,
the FTC complaint for the Chevron Texaco merger speciﬁcally singled out reﬁning, bulk supply and marketing of
California Air Resource Board (CARB) gasoline, a more stringent version of RFG used in California. We do not ﬁnd
evidence that pass-through varies signiﬁcantly for conventional gasoline and special blends.
18than a state that uses two gasoline formulations in roughly equal proportion (eg. Illinois). All
else equal, shifting from using conventional gasoline to using reformulated gasoline exclusively
is associated with a 2.2 cent per gallon increase in the tax inclusive retail price. While the
point estimate on the percent of gasoline meeting oxygenated requirements is positive, it is still
imprecisely estimated.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examine the eﬀect of diesel and gasoline taxes on retail prices. We ﬁnd at least
full, and potentially more than full, pass-through of both federal and state diesel and gasoline
taxes to consumers. The pass-through eﬀects are immediately reﬂected in prices. For diesel,
the pass-through rate is ampliﬁed in cold months, particularly in states with a high fraction
of households using heating oil. Since heating oil and diesel are chemically equivalent, this
is consistent with heating oil use increasing the residual supply elasticity of diesel. We also
consider the eﬀect of reﬁnery capacity constraints and wholesale inventory levels on the pass-
through of diesel and gasoline taxes. We provide support for the notion that pass-through is
considerably less-than 100 percent if tax changes occur when U.S. reﬁnery capacity utilization
is high. This holds for diesel taxes but not for gasoline taxes. This could be due to diﬀerences in
gasoline demand during high capacity utilization months. We ﬁnd that low inventory levels are
associated with higher tax inclusive prices for both gasoline and diesel fuel, and are associated
with greater tax pass-through for gasoline.
Finally, we examine the interaction between gasoline content regulations and tax incidence.
We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between the consistency of a state’s gasoline
regulations and tax pass-through. We estimate that tax pass-through in a state with consistent
regulations (like California) is 22 percentage points higher than pass-through in a state using
two blends in equal proportions (like Illinois). This suggests that the interaction between taxes
and other forms of regulation is likely to have important implications for tax incidence.
Our results inform two current policy debates. First, our results suggest that the beneﬁts
of fuel tax holidays are likely to accrue to consumers during under normal market conditions,
but are likely to be shared by consumers and producers during times at which supply chain
constraints exist. This distinction is important for policy, since tax holidays are most attractive
during time of supply chain constraints and associated high fuel prices. Second, since the burden
on fuel taxes falls primarily on consumers and demand for diesel and gasoline are inelastic,
producer proﬁts are unlikely to fall as taxes rise. Consequently, tax credits or free permits (in
19the case of carbon policy) are unlikely to be necessary to compensate producers.
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24Table A2: Diesel Tax Incidence, PADD level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State diesel tax 0.960 1.009 1.037 1.051
(0.169)*** (0.175)*** (0.133)*** (0.158)***
Federal diesel tax 0.979 0.983
(0.178)*** (0.178)***
State tax t -1 0.032
(0.187)
Covariates X X X
Year, month eﬀects X X
Year*month eﬀects X X
Observations 1747 1698 1706 1698
R-squared 0.56 0.60 0.85 0.85
Standard errors clustered by year*month are in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.
The dependent variable is the one month change in the PADD-level tax inclusive price.
The PADD level tax rate is obtained by taking a weighted average of the tax rates
across states within the PADD. The weights used are the average monthly quantity
of No. 2 distillate consumed in the state.
Other controls in the speciﬁcation shown in column 2 include WTI Crude Spot Price
and its lag. The speciﬁcations shown in columns 3 and 4 have controls for degree days,
degree days interacted with prevalence of household fuel oil use for home heating,
and the unemployment rate. As with the state tax rate, these controls are obtained
by taking a weighted average of the values across states within the PADD. Each
independent variable has been ﬁrst-diﬀerenced.



































St at e  t ax  r at e
Num ber   of   st at es  changi ng  ( r i ght   axi s)
Tax  r at e Num ber   of   st at es

















Number of states changing tax
Avg tax Number of states























-2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Change in tax






















-2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Change in tax
29Table 1: Summary Statistics by Capacity Utilization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall < 85% 85-90% 90-95% >95%
Diesel tax inclusive retail price (c/gall) 120.83 126.21 126.15 129.43 125.76
(19.31) (15.12) (20.10) (18.68) (18.00)
Gasoline tax inclusive retail price (c/gall) 118.15 105.23 112.88 125.98 119.22
(19.03) (16.09) (17.69) (18.40) (15.38)
State diesel quantity tax (c/gall) 18.22 19.00 20.19 20.72 20.64
(5.23) (4.02) (4.73) (5.07) (5.00)
Federal diesel quantity tax (c/gall) 19.79 20.04 22.59 24.00 24.23
(5.24) (1.91) (2.12) (1.22) (0.77)
State gas quantity tax (c/gall) 17.08 14.25 17.14 19.38 16.13
(5.21) (3.85) (4.74) (4.83) (5.77)
Federal gas quantity tax (c/gall) 14.23 9.94 13.29 17.55 14.15
(4.41) (1.93) (4.07) (2.29) (4.96)
Minimum neighboring state diesel tax 14.27 15.22 16.03 16.39 16.37
(4.33) (3.43) (3.87) (4.00) (4.06)
Minimum neighboring state gas tax 13.03 10.53 13.00 15.14 12.21
(4.51) (3.08) (4.21) (4.30) (4.79)
Heating degree days 5.33 8.52 7.48 5.26 1.63
(4.49) (3.21) (4.32) (4.26) (2.30)
Fraction of HH using heating oil 0.28
(0.20)
Diesel Inventories (days) 51.5 54.0 49.2 48.7 48.1
(16.1) (15.2) (13.9) (14.7) (14.8)
Gasoline Inventories (days) 38.8 43.0 39.4 34.8 34.8
(14.6) (13.4) (13.4) (13.7) (14.1)
Unemployment rate 5.71 6.73 5.89 5.06 4.73
(2.08) (1.50) (1.69) (1.41) (1.30)
US Reﬁnery capacity utilization 91.36
(3.89)
Percent Reformulated Gasoline 0.12
(0.29)
Percent Oxygenated Gasoline 0.02
(0.10)
Sum of Squared Content Shares 0.95
(0.14)
Diesel tax raised 0.016 0.027 0.007 0.012 0.012
Gas tax raised 0.022 0.027 0.032 0.014 0.010
Quarter 1 0.39 0.39 0.16 0
Quarter 2 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.44
Quarter 3 0.10 0.23 0.28 0.44
Quarter 4 0.33 0.15 0.34 0.11
Number of months 51 61 80 36
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Each row reports the mean of the stated variable separately for months with the U.S.
reﬁnery capacity utilization stated in the column heading. The exception is the number of
months, which simply reports the number of months that experienced the given capacity
utilization.
The samples used to compute the means diﬀer between column 1 and columns 2-5. The
former uses the entire series, while the latter is based only on those months for which
capacity utilization data is available.
30Table 2: Diesel Tax Incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State diesel tax 1.262 1.218 1.087 1.087 1.071
(0.176)*** (0.124)*** (0.083)*** (0.083)*** (0.086)***
Federal diesel tax 1.081 1.110
(0.252)*** (0.262)***
State tax t -1 0.071
(0.083)
State tax * degree days * HH fuel oil frac 0.055
(0.022)**
Diesel tax * degree days 0.000
(0.004)
State tax * HH fuel oil frac 0.116
(0.513)
WTI Crude Oil Price 1.285 1.232
(0.160)*** (0.172)***
WTI Price t-1 0.831 0.899
(0.127)*** (0.128)***
Oct 1993 3.673 3.613
(1.258)*** (1.299)***
Minimum neighbor tax 1.177 0.739 0.741 0.723
(0.499)** (0.456) (0.456) (0.438)
Degree days -0.021 -0.051 -0.050 0.226
(0.120) (0.076) (0.078) (0.130)*
Degree days * HH Oil Frac. 0.507 0.512 0.506 -0.502
(0.151)*** (0.135)*** (0.138)*** (0.386)
Unemployment rate 0.481 0.446 0.339 0.424
(0.822) (0.498) (0.506) (0.495)
Year, month eﬀects X X
Year*month eﬀects X X X
Observations 5272 5133 5200 5133 5200
R-squared 0.46 0.51 0.77 0.77 0.77
Standard errors clustered by year*month are in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.
The dependent variable is the one month change in the tax inclusive retail price of No. 2 diesel. Each
independent variable has been ﬁrst-diﬀerenced.
31Table 3: Gasoline Tax Incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State gas tax 1.066 1.069 1.053 1.054
(0.089)*** (0.088)*** (0.054)*** (0.054)***
Federal gas tax 1.034 1.038
(0.192)*** (0.190)***
State tax t -1 0.038
(0.046)
WTI Crude Oil Price 1.125 1.125
(0.146)*** (0.145)***
WTI Price t-1 1.037 1.037
(0.148)*** (0.148)***
Oct 1993 2.705 2.688
(1.186)** (1.175)**
Minimum neighbor tax -0.302 -0.029 -0.030
(0.162)* (0.124) (0.124)
Unemployment rate -0.271 0.011 0.016
(0.727) (0.246) (0.248)
Year, month eﬀects X X
Year*month eﬀects X X
Observations 10560 10560 10606 10560
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.77 0.77
Standard errors clustered by year*month are in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.
The dependent variable is the one month change in the tax inclusive retail
price of gasoline. Each independent variable has been ﬁrst-diﬀerenced.
32Table 4: Diesel Incidence and U.S. Reﬁnery Capacity Utilization
Dependent variable: Change in tax inclusive diesel price
Panel A: Split by lagged capacity utilization
<85% 85-90% 90-95% >95%
State diesel tax 1.290 0.995 1.059 0.414
(0.164)*** (0.204)*** (0.076)*** (0.150)***
Observations 1111 1247 1682 660
R-squared 0.71 0.79 0.82 0.79
Panel B: Split by quarter
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
State diesel tax 1.057 1.261 0.953 1.197
(0.184)*** (0.155)*** (0.104)*** (0.036)***
Observations 1257 1268 1323 1352
R-squared 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.75
Standard errors clustered by year*month are in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respec-
tively.
Other controls include month*year eﬀects, the minimum of the
neighboring states’ tax, the number of heating degree days, heating
degree days interacted with household use fuel oil for home heating,
and the state unemployment rate. Each independent variable has
been ﬁrst-diﬀerenced.
Table 5: Gasoline Incidence and U.S. Reﬁnery Capacity Uti-
lization
Dependent variable: Change in tax inclusive gas price
Panel A: Split by lagged capacity utilization
<85% 85-90% 90-95% >95%
State gas tax 1.036 1.007 1.205 0.898
(0.115)*** (0.108)*** (0.109)*** (0.116)***
Observations 1840 2394 3619 1653
R-squared 0.84 0.82 0.77 0.65
Panel B: Split by quarter
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
State gas tax 1.008 0.988 1.065 1.394
(0.117)*** (0.115)*** (0.077)*** (0.048)***
Observations 2663 2702 2620 2621
R-squared 0.83 0.76 0.71 0.73
Standard errors clustered by year*month level are in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, re-
spectively.
Other controls include month*year eﬀects, the minimum of the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 7: Gasoline Tax Incidence and Content Regulations
Dependent variable: Change in tax inclusive gasoline retail price
(1) (2) (3)
State gas tax 1.067*** 1.069*** 0.629**
(0.0598) (0.0598) (0.250)
Percent Reformulated Gas 1.593 2.189**
(1.120) (1.046)
Percent Oxygenated Gas 0.404 1.577
(0.908) (0.975)
Sum of Squared Content Shares -6.047
(5.289)
Sum of Sq. Cont. Shares * 0.451*
State Gas Tax (0.255)
Observations 8148 7977 7977
R-squared 0.788 0.789 0.789
Standard errors, clustered at the state-level, are in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level,
respectively. All variables have been ﬁrst diﬀerenced. Other
controls include month*year ﬁxed eﬀects, the minimum of the
neighboring states’ tax, and the state unemployment rate.
35